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The fantasies that have been generated by the current Indian preoccu-
pation with ‘smart cities’1 (e.g. “100 Smart Cities” 2014; “Smart City in 
India” 2014) compel us to ‘think historically’, to recover insights about 
the future that is generated by the patterns of the past.2 Does the ex-
perience of the recent past contain the promise of a newly fashioned 
urbanism? With what success have visions of urban change taken root, 
or warnings about unplanned growth been heeded in the past? Such 
contemplation on emerging Indian urban forms (i.e. that which is yet 
to be) based on historical knowledge of the city of Bengaluru, and on 
the fate of such dreams worldwide, steers clear of the perils of ‘pre-
diction’.3 Rather the attempt here is to trace, via judicial discourse in 
particular, what urban visions are being brought into existence.  
My argument proceeds in three parts: the first provides a schematic 
history of Bangalore’s urban form as it correlates to the city’s socio-
economic development. The second focuses on the terrain of the law, 
to discuss the controversies around, and legal/political challenges to, 
the Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor (henceforth BMIC) under 
construction by Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises (henceforth 
NICE). The final section brings these two parts together to reflect on 
emerging Indian urbanisms, by reading these (largely legal) debates 
for the signs of a new historical stage, which may render the ‘city,’ 
both as an existing materiality, and as an object of historical research, 































The Past in Bangalore/Bengaluru’s Urban Form  
The career of the name – from Bengaluru to Bangalore and since 2007 
to Bengaluru – signifies the important historical transformations of a 
city whose ‘founding moment’ is traced to the sixteenth century, being 
re-inscribed as a British military cantonment in the nineteenth century, 
and returning to its pre-colonial name as a consequence of linguistic 
politics in the twentieth century. The concern of this paper is, however, 
with the transformations in the “logic of the form” of Bengaluru.4 From 
its early origins as a mercantile town, an entrepot on two important 
trade routes in the peninsula (Annaswamy 2003), Bengaluru thickened 
into an emporium (along with Srirangapatna and Mysore) for manufac-
tures and raw materials for at least two centuries (Gupta 1994), and 
became a recognisable centre of production, particularly of textiles and 
armaments, by the late eighteenth century, the time of Tipu Sultan 
(1782-99). By this time, the city was a bounded, tear-drop shaped 
space which was encircled by walls and ditches, and fortified on the 
southern edge, replete with temples, mosques and dargahs (Fig. 1).  
 






























It was an urban form linked closely to the tanks, market gardens and 
temples, the latter two within and beyond its walls (Srinivas 2004: 38-
44). It’s ‘legibility’ was enhanced by marked spaces for castes/occu-
pations, although in a rich mixture in which the functions of buying and 
selling goods, storing, weaving, manufacturing, and residing over-
lapped. Some of these uses of space in the old city continue to the 
present day. 
      
Fig. 2: Map of Bangelore, c. 18506 
After the fall of Tipu Sultan in 1799 and the establishment of the 
cantonment in 1809, a new urban form took shape (Fig. 2). The city 
was divided spatially between City and Cantonment, separated by a 
swathe of parkland, in an east-west zonation that would continue until 






























(Pani et al. 1985; Nair 1998) while the civil and military station came 
into being to fulfil the strategic imperatives of colonial rule. Places of 
residence were separated from spaces of work, although a mix of 
farming/market gardening was encouraged in the civil and military 
station. Vineyards, grass farms, orchards, and dairy and poultry acti-
vities were interspersed within the station and on its peripheries (Gist 
1986; cf. Venkatarayappa 1957).  
 Industrialisation under colonialism, to the extent that it happened at 
all, was stilted and did not necessarily drive the urban form in the 
same ways it did elsewhere, not even in enclaves. (Hall 1995: 273-
318) Bangalore did not go through the phase of smokestack industrial-
isation that was characteristic of many other colonial cities, such as 
Bombay, Ahmedabad, or Kanpur (Nair 1998). Indeed, even during the 
period of industrial expansion, in the 1930s and 1940s, there was no 
radical or enduring reworking of city space (Gist 1986; Venkataray-
appa 1957), though post-plague planning (after 1898) led to the es-
tablishment of a number of new, primarily middle class settlements 
(Heitzman 2004: 35) (Fig 3 & 4). 
      






























     
Fig. 4: Map of Bangelore, 19248 
In the decades following 1947 – the period of Planning for Patriotic 
Production – Bangalore was the site of another transformation, with 
the design and implementation of the most ambitious city form: the 
industrial township (Nair 2005: 136) (Fig 5). Yet, even these develop-
ments remained enclaved, though very soon transforming the areas 
around the units, as more villages were urbanised (Nair 2005: 136-
40). Between 1940-1960, say V. L. S. Prakasa Rao and Tewari, 
“infilling had taken place, in the form of residential development in the 
interstitial area” as a result of which “the urban texture lost its com-
pactness” (Rao & Tewari 1999: 228). 
 Indeed, the next phase (1960 onwards) was one of ‘leap-frogging’ 
of institutional and industrial complexes such as Bangalore University 
and Indian Telephone Industries (ITI) (ibid.: 229; cf. Behera et al 
1985: 5). Even so, the intermixed uses of urban space continued until 
the 1970s. The first signs of an overburdened urban infrastructure led 
to anguished calls to deflect the surge into the city. C. J. Padmanabha, 






























green belt as a band to prevent further city growth; he also stressed 
the importance of reducing mixed uses of urban space. He was among 
the first to suggest the shift of productive activities, especially those 
involving animals, to “milk colonies in the Ring Towns”. Alarmed by the 
influx of migrants, he pleaded for ring towns in “Yelahanka, Nela-
mangala, Doddballapur, Hoskote, Whitefield, Kengeri, Ramanagaram, 
Magadi, Anekal, round Bangalore” (Padmanabaha 1973; cf. Prasanna & 
Vathsala 1983).9 
    
Fig. 5: ITI Industrial Township, 1950s10 
By the 1980s, both the city’s traditional urban core and civil station 
lost their characteristic features: among the notable changes was the 
disappearance of tanks and tank beds. Bangalore entered a new phase 
of urbanism marked by the gated residential enclave. Planning, which 
in its originary sense was intended as a state check on unbridled 
competition for scarce urban space, was itself on offer here. Against a 
backdrop of long acknowledged failures, state planning yielded place to 
planning-as-commodity, a promise of not only ensured water supply, 
electricity and other scarce commodities, but also withdrawal from the 
uncertainties and intolerable strains of the social life of Indian cities. At 






























declined, as tank beds, casurina plantations, and orchards and gardens 
disappeared under large scale building activities (Fig 6). 
 
Fig. 6: Map of Bangalore, 196011 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, planners, sociologists, geographers, 
and economists cautioned against the dangers of overcrowding and 
urged the building of alternatives or “counter magnets” to the fatal 
attractions of the city (Ramachandran 1989). Variously called ring 
towns, satellite towns, new towns/townships, these were seen as the 
panacea to the formless urban sprawl. Many of these were predicated 
on the development of high speed corridors. From the 1990s, the bur-
geoning Information Technology and IT-Enabled Services sector both 
adapted to the existing structure of the city, and spawned the tech 
park, which defined work, play and leisure in new and exclusive ways, 






























itised habitat. The demand for a dedicated ‘tech corridor’ attempted to 
connect in situ developments between Whitefield and Koramangala 
(Fig. 7). 
 
Fig. 7: Central Business District, Bangalore c. 200012 
The new urbanism was distinguished from all its previous forms since it 
made motion and circulation an end in itself (Sennett 1996). Sub-
ordinate to no other driving material force, planning responded to “im-
plosion-explosion” (Lefebvre (2003 [1970]), meaning urban concen-
tration, rural exodus, extension of the urban fabric, subordination of 
the agrarian to the urban) to take the form of “Corridor Urbanism” 
(Hall 1995: 273-318). A good instance of this emerging form is the 
NICE corridor, which proposes to connect the two cities of Bangalore 






























But before discussing the project itself, I would like to lay out the 
three force-fields that are crucial to the production of urban space – 
namely, planning, law and politics. Planning, despite its well-inten-
tioned public face, by definition excludes all but the technocrats; many 
have acknowledged that in the Bangalore context, planning had largely 
been “unimaginative, partial, restrictive and negative, geared only to 
restrict land speculation, but without being able to realise even that 
objective” (Ramachandran 1989: 46). Planning activity is indeed the 
‘rule of experts’. Politics offer the only hope of being a negotiable 
resource to which the poor and marginalised may turn (Mertens 1996; 
cf. Nair 2005). The field of the law, as we well know, is used to delay 
and defer, but less rarely to overturn processes that are well under 
way, in addition to being unaffordable to many among the poor and 
marginalised. Even so, the law has strategically been used by those 
hoping to correct administrative or even political wrongs. 
However, I read court judgments between 1997 and 2006 relating in 
particular to land acquisition for infrastructure projects such as NICE, 
not in order to speak of the prospects of justice but to decipher what 
they might tell us about the new urban form that the courts feel oblig-
ed to bring into being. Both the court and the legislature reveal a wilful 
ignorance about the history of repeated failures of plans for ‘saving’ 
the big city. Let us turn to judicial reasoning about the rapid changes 
that are happening to city spaces/urban form in cases relating to the 
proposed corridor between Bangalore and Mysore.  
Expressway to Corridor: The Judiciary vs. the Legislature 
The proliferating discontents around the construction of a Bangalore 
Mysore Infrastructure Corridor (henceforth BMIC) have unduly pro-
longed and delayed indefinitely the completion of a prestigious project 
which had its roots in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1995 
between the Government of Karnataka and the Governor, State of 
Massachusetts (Badrinath 2011)13 when H.D. Deve Gowda (Janata Dal 
[Secular], hereafter JD [S]) was Chief Minister of Karnataka. In 1997, 
another JD [S], Chief Minister J. H. Patel, signed the Framework 
Agreement, which was thereafter to be the cornerstone of the project, 
with a consortium of three: Kalyani Group (Pune), SAB Engineering 
(Pennsylvania, USA) and Vanasse Hangin Brustlin, (Boston, USA). In 
1998, the Government of Karnataka awarded the Build Operate Own 
Transfer contract to NICE. By 1999, when the S. M. Krishna led Con-






























mental clearances applied for, and loans sought for this mega project, 
which was estimated to cost 8,400 million Indian Rupees.  
Planned in part as a four lane (extendable to six) privately built and 
operated toll expressway of 111 km between the two cities Bengaluru 
and Mysore, the corridor development includes five “self-sustaining” 
independent townships, a peripheral road of 41 km around Bengaluru, 
a 9.5 km long link road and an elevated link to the heart of the capital 
city as well (Samiti n.d.). The high volume of contests over this project 
over the past 19 years, whether in courtroom or legislature, on streets 
or among NGOs, has ensured that no more than a paltry 41 km around 
Bengaluru city has been built so far. A news report of 2011 claimed 
that NICE had won its 566th court case when the SC rejected the need 
for a Lok Ayuktha (or anti-corruption ombudsman) probe into the pro-
ject (Badrinath 2011). 
The project can be seen as a sign of a new economic and political 
order; but of what kind?14 More appropriately, as the conception and 
execution of this project is yoked to the fate of two cities, does this 
‘infrastructure construction’ represent a textbook example of the swit-
ching of capital from primary circuits of production to the secondary 
(i.e. of enhancing the built environment for production) in order to re-
solve the crisis of over-accumulation (Lefebvre 2003: 160; cf. Harvey 
1984: 236)? Or, if we are not to take space as an inert commodity but 
as a set of relations which are produced in specific economic and 
political circumstances, are we witnessing a new phase in the develop-
ment of subcontinental capitalism and the rise of a new urbanism?15 
In his discussion of economic transformation in contemporary India 
and the realm of democracy, Partha Chatterjee has outlined some fea-
tures of what he identifies as the new phase in which corporate capital 
has established its moral-political hegemony over, among other things, 
the apparatuses of the (formerly relatively autonomous) state, such as 
the bureaucracy and the judiciary. Yet this is not identical to the 
‘transitions’ to bourgeois democracy that may have been experienced 
elsewhere, because of what he describes as “political society” whose 
activities belong to another domain, that which is more “temporary, 
contextual and unstable arrived at through direct political negotiations” 
(Chatterjee 2008: 57). Following Kalyan Sanyal’s seminal critique of 
the transition (to capitalism) narrative, Chatterjee ties the economic 
spheres of corporate and non-corporate capital to civil and political 
society respectively. The new role of the state has been to ameliorate 






























with the means of labour, through the production and sustenance of a 
“need economy” which aids the process of capital accumulation (San-
yal 2007: 69-70). 
Is the field of forces in contemporary Karnataka an affirmation of 
this insightful formulation? There is no doubt that the BMIC has seized 
hold of the planning/bureaucratic and judicial imagination in ways that 
signal a consensus about the imperatives of ‘growth’ – here standing 
for rapid capitalist growth, uncontaminated by any early postcolonial 
notions of developmentalist growth. Michael Goldman has argued with 
reference to several new projects coming up around Bengaluru, the 
BMIC included, that we are entering a new phase of world city broker-
ing, of “speculative urbanism” in which governments too have played a 
major role (Goldman 2011: 555-81). The unspecified claims of the 
company which has undertaken this project, NICE, under the leader-
ship of the ‘serial entrepreneur’ Ashok Kheny,16 have been able to win 
over courts, legislators, and the media itself to become the unques-
tionable commonsense in this period. In the earliest judgment on the 
public interest petition filed by H. T. Somasekhar Reddy in 1997 (here-
after H. T. Somasekhar Reddy), the Karnataka High Court said:  
Government was satisfied that the interests of the State of 
Karnataka would be best served if the infrastructure corridor is 
industrially and commercially developed as contemplated by the 
Infrastructure Corridor Project Technical Report, as such develop-
ment would promote industrial, commercial and economic growth 
in the Karnataka State generally and in Bangalore in particular. It 
will create new job opportunities to the residents in and around 
the Infrastructure Corridor, promote tourism, decongest traffic in 
Bangalore and Mysore and ensure smooth and safer traffic 
between Bangalore and Mysore and provide a world-class Ex-
pressway between them. (H. T. Somashekar Reddy 1998) 
In the semantic shift from the conception of a Bangalore Mysore 
Expressway to an “infrastructure corridor”, (as decided in the first 
meeting of the High Level Committee on 14.6.1995, see Proceedings 
1995) the project’s scope has been broadened, opening opportunities 
of framing both claims to its overall importance and opposition to the 
project. The BMIC has been imagined as the connector not merely bet-
ween two cities but to a global order, as relieving the pressure of the 
exploding cities of Bengaluru and Mysore. This ostensible common 
sense has remained unquestioned in judgment after judgment, both in 
the High Court and the Supreme Court, emerging as the inaugural 






























speculative enterprise in the ‘public interest’ that has provided the 
opposition, both within the legislature and outside it, with some of its 
most potent weapons.  
Yet the trajectory of events over the last 19 years, and the shifts 
and changes that have occurred in this dense field of forces regarding 
the fate of the BMIC, disturb the schematic oppositions that have been 
outlined by Partha Chatterjee. While consensus may indeed have 
emerged around the logic of the form, (i.e. the necessity of producing 
specific built environments for world production/consumption of which 
the infrastructure corridor is a good example), the dialectics of con-
tent, which in turn may effect, alter or even stall the logic of the form, 
(with all its contradictions and challenges) must also be taken into 
account while thinking about what (anticipated or unanticipated) form 
is ushered into being.  
Why has this scheme been consistently upheld, and the rights of the 
company asserted, often in opposition to the Government’s cautions, 
by the judiciary? A historically unprecedented quantum of land has 
been demanded, amounting to 20,193 acres spread over 141 full vil-
lages and 52 part villages in four districts, of which 6956 acres is 
government land, and 13,302 is private (Samiti, n.d.). This represents 
an almost eight-fold increase over the 1988 estimate of 2,600 acres 
for the expressway (Proceedings 1995).17 In contrast to the near una-
nimity of the judiciary, why has the state shifted and changed its 
position from willing accomplice to chief opponent, before being forced 
back into performing its role as accomplice once more? What accounts 
for this fickleness of the legislature as opposed to the consistency of 
the judiciary? And are those whose lands and lives are being indis-
putably ravaged mute recipients of the injustice of expropriation, this 
accumulation by dispossession?  
This paper pays central attention to the terrain of the law, and its 
role in the production of the BMIC. Considered here as both a structure 
and as a process, the field of law itself brings clarity to production/-
consumption relations while largely shedding its earlier mantle of 
dispensing justice, despite the fact that it has been one of the key sites 
which have been approached by all parties in the contest. More im-
portantly, I would like to trace the ways in which judicial discourse has 
redefined key concepts in post-independence quests for justice, name-
ly the realms of ‘public purpose’ and ‘public interest’. This will allow for 
speculation on the possible new urban form that the courts in parti-






























Public Purpose in a Time of ‘Speculative Urbanism’ 
In a number of decisions of the 1950s and 1960s, land acquisition for 
productive purposes, i.e. constructing public sector units in Bangalore, 
were usually upheld by the courts as representing public purposes, 
since they reflected not just regional but national industrial concerns 
(Nair 2005: 166-99). There was a willingness to concede the demand 
for higher compensation without overturning acquisitions as such. The 
unwieldy growth of Bangalore by the 1970s put new pressures on 
urbanisable space in the city which called for policy and legislative 
measures that limited, without actually directing, the changes that 
were occurring.  
The Bangalore Development Authority, which combined planning 
and development functions, was set up in 1976 to prevent what was 
perceived as the growing menace of private layouts and also chop 
down the growing visibility and importance of the House Building 
Cooperative Societies. Devaraj Urs’ regime, 1972-80, (justifiably called 
the most important non-communist regime in India, for its focus on 
questions of social justice, cf. Manor 1980) was the time when many 
efforts were made to regulate and centralise transactions on land, and 
a time when a number of legislative checks on land use were insti-
tuted. But state controls themselves led to a vast market in illegalities, 
variously of private players, house building cooperative societies, and 
the state, on which the judiciary was forced to function as a partial 
check. 
Meanwhile, not content with the demand for higher compensation, 
landowners often approached the courts to challenge planning docu-
ments themselves, and question the “public purpose” for which the 
Bangalore Development Authority “exercised their special powers to 
deprive one section of the public to favour another section of the 
public” (BDA 1991: 11). Land acquisition for industrialisation and the 
construction of large facilities such as airports was rarely overturned, 
even while a moral argument portraying the rural landowner as a 
victim of urban interests was repeatedly asserted in courts. Courts 
routinely observed the ‘colourable’ (i.e. less than transparent, ‘interes-
ted’) exercise of power, though by the 1980s the illegalities of the 
state had far outstripped the puny illegalities of the revenue site hol-
ders or even housing cooperatives. The notion of ‘public purpose’ was 
freely used by both those laying claim to the land and those opposing 































In a case involving Dayanand Pai and his attempt to take over a 
tank bed in 1987, the court said “it appears to us this is nothing more 
than a conspiracy to deprive the owners of the lands by use of the 
power of eminent domain which is to be used for an avowedly public 
purpose, and for strong and compelling reasons and not whimsically or 
to satisfy the private needs of an individual.”18 The court repeatedly 
and successfully revealed and struck down such colourable exercise of 
power in the name of public purpose, whether in the matter of the 
Chief Minister himself playing the role of an estate agent (as in the 
NRIHA case of 1988-89) or those who claimed exceptions to the Urban 
Land Ceiling Act (as in the Revajeetu case of 1987) (Nair 2005: 166-
99). 
Such judicial frankness has become rare in the torrent of cases 
related to BMIC. The judiciary has marked a significant shift in rede-
fining public purpose to emphasise deepening links between company 
and state and in fact holds the state accountable to the company 
rather than the other way around. (We may note here in passing a 
significant absence of discussions relating to mass housing, particularly 
for the poor, which every litigant in the 1980s/1990s felt obliged to 
recite).19 This was clear in H. T. Somasekhar Reddy which challenged 
the Framework Agreement (hereafter FWA) between the Government 
of Karnataka (GoK) and NICE on the basis of a technical report pro-
duced by a consortium consisting of the Kalyani Group of Pune, SAB 
Engg, USA and Vanasse Hangan Brustlin.  
H. T. Somasekhar Reddy challenged the project on many grounds: 
that the road was a mere ruse for real estate production, since the 
principle interest of the company was in the five townships; that the 
state had awarded the contract without competitive bidding; that more 
land than necessary for road construction had been acquired; that the 
state and its apparatuses were “bound hand and foot” under the Build 
Own Operate Transfer agreement to serve the company through land 
acquisition procedures, tax exemptions, and guaranteed resources 
such as water and power. The High Court, however, concurred with the 
“purposiveness” of the project and validated the FWA which henceforth 
became non-negotiable in all future judgements: 
Experience has shown that all sorts of activities industrial, 
commercial, cultural and other such and similar activities tend to 
concentrate in one city which ultimately ends up in choking the 
system, resulting in shortages of essential elements required for 
good living like clean environment, water, electricity, clean air, 






























other things reducing the city to a big slum. Experiment of 
developing self-sufficient small cities with sufficient water, elec-
tricity, good environment along with the Toll Road as a Corridor 
Project, catering to the needs of the people living there as sup-
porting cities to the big cities shall be a boon, helping the people 
living in big cities to lead a much better life. It would relieve con-
gestion in the big cities. People living in the newly developed 
small towns in the Corridor Project would be getting the benefits 
of big city life without its disadvantages […] Construction of an 
expressway between Bangalore Mysore is a public purpose [...]. 
(H. T. Somashekar Reddy 1998: § 49-50, emphasis added) 
The court not only agreed with the reasonableness of the administra-
tive action but accepted the inability of the state to undertake such a 
project, concluding that the government was not obliged to call for 
tenders: it denied that the executive decisions were cloaked in secrecy 
and accepted the public purpose of the project, since “high level 
officials” had been involved. It also renewed the legitimacy of the 
township plan. (We will return to the question of whether this judge-
ment signalled a move towards saving existing cities such as Benga-
luru and Mysore, or was envisaging an alternative to them.) It bears 
restatement that this conclusion flies counter to clear evidence of the 
historical failure of satellite towns, and of other similar plans to act as 
counter magnets to the metropolis, discussed above. Even the Special 
Leave Petition moved by Reddy in the Supreme Court was un-
successful (Special Leave Petition 1998): indeed the court asked the 
state government to fulfil its obligations to the company as speedily as 
possible. The MP from Dharwad South, Manjunath Kunnu, emphasised 
in Parliament the need for speedy completion of the project, making 
handy use of Ashok Kheny’s status as a son of the soil who should be 
encouraged: “people friendly mega projects,” he said, “must be exe-
cuted at a faster pace.”20 
Meanwhile, in 2003, a minor fissure had appeared on the homo-
genous surface of judicial reasoning when a single judge hearing a 
batch of writ petitions against acquisitions around Bangalore revealed 
several new kinds of illegalities of the company/state. The court there-
fore asked for only the road to be built minus the townships. While 
legitimising the acquisition of land for the road (60 percent)21 it qua-
shed the notification of 40 percent of the land, on the grounds that the 
owners of the land were not told for what purpose the land was being 
notified and were therefore deprived of their right to challenge the 






























The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, which was called 
on to review the judgment, swiftly recovered the lost ground and 
threw its weight behind the company. The Division Bench (2005) set 
aside the single judge finding on the grounds that “the government 
has the power to build townships and not just infrastructure” and went 
further in suggesting that all activities of the modern state need not 
serve a public purpose. The Division Bench also argued that the “doc-
trine of severability” could not apply to a project which had to be 
completed in toto, and that in any case land had not been acquired by 
the government for “an affluent industrial house” (S. M. Mohan Nadgir 
2005). What we see here is the second step taken by the judiciary, the 
redefinition of what constitutes legitimate public interest in questioning 
public purpose.22 
By 2004, any coyness on the part of the judiciary about questioning 
the Legislature in matters of public policy was jettisoned in favour of 
ordering the Government of Karnataka to fulfil its obligations to the 
company. By way of response to the first of a set of three writ peti-
tions, filed by J.C. Madhuswamy, Srirama Reddy and S. Munegowda 
(the first two being legislators) which drew attention to the violation of 
the FWA by NICE and uncovered a wide range of new illegalities, the 
court invoked the grounds of res judicata. It claimed that H.T Somase-
khar Reddy had already covered similar ground and sternly denounced 
what it saw as a needless drag on economic growth, namely political 
interference leading to delays: 
The petitioners who are only projecting the cause of the State 
Government too cannot be allowed to agitate the issue that any 
excess land was provided for the implementation of the Project. 
They, as representatives of the people or ordinary citizens of the 
State could, at the most, be interested in the implementation of 
the Project but whether any excess land had been taken for the 
Project or not could not be their concern. The Court cannot allow 
its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay the 
implementation of a public project which is in larger public inte-
rest nor can the Court allow anyone to gain a political objective. 
These legislators who have not been successful in achieving their 
objective on the floor of the Assembly have now chosen this 
forum to achieve their political objective which cannot be allowed. 
Nandi may not be wrong in asserting that J.C. Madhuswamy and 
two others have filed the writ petition with an oblique motive. It is 
alleged that despite the fact that the land around Bangalore which 
has been acquired for the Project and vests in the State Govern-
ment has been allowed to be sold by the original landowners in 
favour of some influential persons and that the State authorities 






























by Nandi as it is asserted that the writ petition has been filed only 
to protect the interests of such influential persons. If that be so, 
the petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out at the 
threshold and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs. (Divi-
sion Bench 2005, emphasis added) 
The court expressed its outrage at the Government of Karnataka’s 
second thoughts on the FWA. The FWA was once more flourished by 
the courts as the contract on which the state could not renege, and to 
be unquestioningly implemented in letter and spirit. The court saw 
itself as a much needed corrective on these legislative ‘flip flops’. It 
severely castigated the needless and wasteful political process which 
came in the way of the completion of the project.  
It was only a short step to further absolve the company of any 
misdemeanor, thereby equating public purpose with company interest. 
The court therefore brushed aside the charge that several cases had 
been filed on behalf of the company itself by interested others (refer-
ring to the two other writs under consideration – filed by All India 
Manufacturers Association (All India Manufacturers vs. State of Karna-
taka and Others 2005) and Dakshinamurthy, urging speedy completion 
of the project): 
[…] learned Senior Counsel Mr. G.L. Sanghi and the learned 
Advocate General were not wrong in contending that these [two 
other writs] had been filed at the behest of Nandi. That may be 
so, but at the same time we find that the prayers made therein, 
though they support the cause of Nandi, subserve the interest of 
the public at large. As already noticed, they are making a prayer 
for a direction to the State Government and its instrumentalities 
to forthwith execute the Project in its totality as originally con-
ceived and upheld by this Court in Somashekar Reddy’s case. (All 
India Manufacturers 2005, emphasis added) 
The SC deciding on the appeal of the State Government against the HC 
judgement reiterated this common sense: “there could hardly be a 
dispute that the project is a mega project which is in large public inte-
rest of the state of Karnataka.”23 Indeed, there was no question of 
separating the road construction from the construction of townships 

































The Quixotic Role of the Legislature 
In contrast to the near unanimity of the courts is the apparent fickle-
ness of government, which gave with an open hand in the 1990s, 
backtracked in the 2000s, and called for a review of the project which 
had been dubbed, at least initially by B. S. Yeddyurappa, as the 
“biggest scam in world history” (Samiti n.d.: 705). The media and the 
judiciary have interpreted these vacillations as the unconcealed ambi-
tions of the party in power at different points of time.24  
After 1997, the courts were flooded with public interest litigation 
and the single judge decision against townships was made. Former 
Chief Minister H. D. Deve Gowda himself began to make accusations of 
corruption, and to demand that the project be stopped until the innu-
merable cases were resolved. Accusing the state government of having 
acquired more than was necessary for the expressway project and 
indeed the townships (over 29,000 acres, instead of 20,193), Deve 
Gowda demanded a thorough probe into the ‘irregularities’ which were 
cropping up in the project.25 
An opportunity was found when the new Janata Dal-Secular/Con-
gress coalition government under Chief Minister Dharam Singh took 
power in 2004. It moved swiftly to re-examine the whole project. The 
Government of Karnataka ordered not only a second look at the 
acquisition process through the appointment of the K.C. Reddy Expert 
Committee in 2004 (which recommended a reduction of notified land 
up to 2,450 acres) but began de-notifying lands selectively, parti-
cularly around Bangalore city indicating that lands which were a good 
distance from the proposed road had been notified (“Government to 
sign BMIC Project” 2004). The J. C. Madhuswamy petition (J. C. 
Madhuswamy and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others 2004, 
hereafter J. C. Madhuswamy 2004) was filed in 2005 and thrown out 
by a Division Bench in 2006. That same year, following a heated de-
bate in the legislature, which led to the demand for a CBI enquiry, a 
fresh call for global tenders was made (“BMIC in Trouble” 2006), 
though this was withdrawn by 2008, and the idea of a special legis-
lation dropped.  
The J. C. Madhuswamy petition rightly noted that there were several 
alarming signs that the NICE had not been adhering to the terms of 
the FWA in fulfilling its side of the bargain, and indeed may never be 
able to do so. There was growing unease about the capacity of NICE to 
fulfil its part of the agreement, since even ten years after the genesis 






























company “the state and all its citizens between Bangalore and Mysore 
are yet to see even a single yard of the so called expressway road” 
(J.C. Madhuswamy 2004). J. C. Madhuswamy showed that the state 
had defaulted in its role of deliberating on its policies, as became evi-
dent as the ‘project’ unfolded. The original FWA tied the construction of 
the road to the complete handover of land to the company, failing 
which the work on the road could not begin. The petition listed the 
kinds of illegalities that had developed after 1997: 
- acquisition was being paid for by mortgaging government lands 
with banks (150 crores). 
- the consortium had disappeared, leaving only the family firm of 
the Khenys, NICE. 
- Karnataka Industrial and Development Board (KIADB) had noti-
fied land beyond the sanctioned corridor areas: while NICE had 
demanded 1,600 acres for roads, interchanges, service roads, 
etc., 5,455 acres were acquired, all located around Bengaluru. 
- NICE identified the land, while acquisition was undertaken by the 
state. In 2003/2004 the KIADB acknowledged that the company, 
not the government, decided land requirements when the Special 
Deputy Commissioner Anees Siraj admitted:  
Land acquisition notifications were issued based on 
requirements indicated by promoter company [sic.], and not 
on the basis of any technical drawing maps as approved by 
the government in PWD or project report. (Samiti, n.d.: 
435-6) 
- even de-notification26 was quite arbitrary, as in 2003, when 
Minister of Industries and Commerce R. V. Deshpande de-notified 
some lands around Bengaluru. 
- NICE alone claimed there was no excess acquisition though  
each of the functionaries and instrumentalities of the gov-
ernment, right from the Empowered Committee, including 
the minutes of the Minister of Industries, the KIADB, the 
Project Coordinator and the Expert Committee were con-
scious of the excess acquisition and directed its deletion.27  
- NICE was given a generous ten years to buy the Government 
land. 
- high ranking officials were enthusiastically endorsing the demands 






























- a new planning authority (Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Cor-
ridor Planning Area, hereafter BMICPA) was constituted in 1999, 
which included areas already planned and zoned for Bangalore in 
1995 and operational up to 2005. (Thus the peripheral toll road 
which was finally built by NICE was in fact a usurpation of the toll 
free Outer Peripheral Road planned by the BDA). 
- NICE used bitumen rather than the promised cement-concrete for 
its road. 
Importantly, the J. C. Madhuswamy petition claimed that land in the 
areas around the peripheral road which had been constructed, around 
the proposed interchanges, had already changed hands and passed to 
private builders.28 The market was openly and directly driving plan-
ning, a form of market led ‘boosterism’, in collusion with the state. 
Planning itself was subordinated to the needs of the company, as in 
the creation of a new authority (BMICPA, mentioned above) and amen-
dments were made to the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development 
Board (KIADB) Act to include trade and tourism as legitimate industrial 
infrastructural activities.  
The striking convergence of the stands of the bureaucracy and 
judiciary was also predicated on the original claim of the company to 
‘scientificity’ in its survey and identification of the land for the project. 
As early as 1997, the court said “Every minute detail was explained 
including the scientific method adopted by the respondent for identi-
fication of land for the project” (H. T. Somashekar Reddy 1998). Henri 
Lefebvre has described the “generalized terrorism of the quantifiable, 
which accentuates the efficiency of repressive space, amplifies it 
without fear and without reproach, all the more so because of its self 
justifying nature, its apparent scientificity” (Lefebvre 2003 [1970]: 
185). While that which is not quantifiable has not found favour within a 
judiciary committed to such ostensible ‘scientificity’, courts remained 
curiously blind to ways in which that ‘scientificity’ evaporated over 
time. As the Dalit Sangarsh Samiti’s (n.d.) White Paper on BMIC 
revealed, NICE took refuge behind a “typographical error” to claim the 
1600 acres (instead of the 1506 acres considered adequate for the first 
phase of its road project), and refused to respond to the demand for 
data by the K. C. Reddy committee enquiring into acquisition of excess 
lands in 2004 (J. C.Madhuswamy 2004: Annexures § 15, 43). 
The NICE’s own plan submissions reveal deliberate vagueness rather 
than scientific precision: “To avoid speculation, no survey of lands has 






























been taken to know ground conditions. Ground conditions are further 
examined by limited walking along […]” (Bangalore-Mysore Infra-
structure Corridor Project Technical Report 1995: 1.13). The State 
supported these inaccuracies by declaring that notifications for large 
swathes of land were necessary, even before the particulars of the 
road alignment were finally decided. And the State itself submitted 
before the courts that it discovered that the cash strapped NICE had 
mortgaged and/or sold a proportion of the allotted government land to 
raise the funds to pay for land acquisition (J. C. Madhuswamy 2004: 
§40). 
There were many reasons why the case came up for renewed 
scrutiny in the legislature. J. C. Madhuswamy was at pains to point out 
that infrastructure construction was a process which continually en-
gendered new illegalities, in which politicians also played a part (for 
instance, changing the alignment of the road to go through precious 
water bodies, despite court orders (Kulkarni 2012). The complainants 
attempted to show the evolving and contingent nature of forces 
engaged in the production of space, confirming David Harvey’s as-
sessment that “[…] the action of capital itself (particularly through 
investment in transport and communications) can create spatial rela-
tionships” (Harvey 1984: 341).The courts however consistently took 
the stand that the FWA as upheld in H. T. Somashekar Reddy was in-
violable, thereby freezing the political process and economic conditions 
to the moment of its signing in 1997. While penalising the state gov-
ernment in 2005 for withholding information, the courts were refusing 
to acknowledge that new spatial relations, contests and challenges, as 
well as the new illegalities of the company, were engendered by the 
project itself. 
In the period between 1997 and 2004, changes in governments and 
their short term goals led to certain reversals of earlier stands. What 
was latent was the capacity of the state to create and control liquid 
resources such as real estate, and the judiciary’s role in the production 
of urban space, a commodity in itself.29 A powerful mechanism of glo-
balisation, as Kevin Gotham points out, is the work done by the state 
in “delocalising” land and converting it into a liquid financial asset 
(Gotham 2006: 231-75). Real estate financing may be globalised, but 
production remains localised. Particularly in the context of countries 
like India, the task of “delocalising” land, of disembedding it from 
certain kinds of social activities (putatively agriculture) occurs along-
side its embedding in new social activities. The state is, therefore, an 






























Goldman (2010) suggests, but it simultaneously needs to rein in overly 
speculative activities, especially given the contradictory pressures of 
representative democracy.  
This is why Osman Balaban, in his study of the built environment of 
Turkey in the contemporary period, qualifies the classical theories of 
capital switching when he says “political actors especially the govern-
ment have essential reasons to initiate capital flows into the production 
of built environment no less than economic actors […] urban built 
environment could be conceptualised not only as the secondary circuit 
of capital accumulation but also as the secondary circuit of political 
continuity and legitimacy” (Balaban 2008: 288-9). But even Balaban’s 
conceptual framework does not account for the political costs of the 
process of dis-embedding land, in a social and economic setting that is 
in flux for a number of reasons. The protests both within and beyond 
the courts in the last 19 years have redefined the meaning and depth 
of the ‘public’ in whose name both the growth activities and the op-
position to it are being initiated. More importantly for our discussion 
here, it creates a new common sense about the necessity of dissolving 
the difference between city and rural area and in rewriting the relation-
ship of the city to urbanism.  
The Corridor as a Sign of New Urbanism or is the City 'History'? 
In his well-known 1970 provocation on what he termed the contem-
porary ‘urban revolution’ Henri Lefebvre pointed out that the tools one 
used to study the industrial city were no longer adequate to an under-
standing of what he called ‘urban society’ i.e. the expanded scale of 
urbanism which threatened to dissolve the distinctions between rural 
and urban, between cores and peripheries (Lefebvre 2003 [1970]). If 
Gideon Sjoberg (1960) separated fifty-five centuries of city life from 
the age of industrialisation, which ushered in a radically new urban 
form, characterised by “the factory, the railways and the slum” (Mum-
ford 1989: 458), it was in order to emphasise that the industrial city 
bore no relation to its forebears. Lefebvre went further in suggesting 
that just as industrialisation marked a new and radical discontinuity in 
the relationship between the village and the city, since a sharper 
distinction had now emerged between the modern city as industrial 
‘effect’, and urbanism, which was more generalised, and itself the 
motor of accumulation. 
It has been sweepingly contended that our colonial past did not 
engender the industrial city, an urban form that at first brought the 






























446). Rhoads Murphey characterised the Asian city as one which 
subordinated the economic to the cultural and the social: the city was 
a symbol of authority, of legitimacy and power, literature and culture, 
in other words commercial and industrial functions were decidedly 
secondary (Murphey 1972). Despite the obvious exaggerations and 
indeed a-historicity of such a formulation, one could certainly agree 
that the economic in the pre-colonial city was embedded in a wide 
range of practices instead of dominating them – one thinks of the 
qasba, temple town or even the colonial port city.  
Colonialism as a form of power engendered “dependent urban-
isation” reflecting purely military, administrative and political functions, 
rather than creating a modern city powered by industrialisation (King 
1976). Atiya Habeeb noted, while contrasting the preponderance of 
secondary occupations in industrialising countries of the nineteenth 
century with Indian occupational patterns in the same period, that 
there was only a “spurious tertiarisation” in colonial India, namely the 
proliferation of services neither linked nor conducive to economic 
development (Habeeb 1991). How useful then is Lefebvre in helping us 
think through the specificities of the Indian modern in the contempo-
rary period? Will there be a convergence of trajectories in the future?  
By way of an answer, let us examine the arguments made for the 
construction of a new expressway almost parallel to the existing State 
Highway 17, and in addition to State Highway 89.30 The Kalyani group 
argued in its promotional brochure that geometrical expansion of these 
existing highways could not take place due to the thickening of 
buildings and activities on both sides. Ribbon development, i.e. mush-
rooming growth along all state and national highways, which in plan 
after plan from the 1960s was lamented as the sure sign of planning 
gone awry, has in the NICE corridor project been avoided only by 
conceptually elevating highway dependent townships to a principle of 
planning itself. The idea of distributing urbanism along the highway, 
far from being a utopian concept, anticipates and capitalises on the 
tendency for ribbon development, and makes it into a principle for pro-
fit (Proceedings of the High Level Committee, 1995: §2) The BMIC, 
amply aided by government and judiciary, models these new nodes as 
dedicated ‘dormitory towns’ for the two big cities.  
But it also signals a new stage in the life and death of cities in India, 
a unique and new annihilation of space by time. What is embodied in 
the idea of the township here has been anticipated to a certain extent 






























fullness of ‘inhabiting’ to an impoverished social life represented by the 
term ‘habitat’ referring to a box or function. ‘Inhabiting’, on the other 
hand, means “relationships with groups of objects, classes of acts, and 
people […] produc[ing] certain relationships rather than receiving them 
or passively perceiving them” (Lefebvre 2003 [1970]: 81). BMIC/NICE 
townships while aiming to produce a kind of ‘boutique rural’ which 
combines the opportunities of the city with the abundance of the rural 
only results in this formless urban exudation which is not a city at all 
but an anti-city, one that “annihilates the city wherever it collides with 
it” (Mumford 1989: 505). 
The corridor classically devours space in order to save time. It also 
evades or escapes the city, reducing human life to the less than animal 
existence of eating, sleeping, and reproducing in the ideologised pro-
duction of new ‘dwelling machines’ (cf. Sanyal 2011). Five townships 
that have been proposed as part of the BMIC are respectively: an Eco-
Tourism centre close to Mysore, a Heritage Centre near Channapatna, 
an Industrial Centre near Ramanagaram, a Corporate Centre near 
Bidadi, and a Commercial Centre near Bengaluru. What act of ‘creative 
destruction’ will be engendered in producing these five different town-
ships to herald a new urban order?31 In the prose of the brochure, one 
may detect not the imagination of saving the existing cities, but 
escaping from them. The existing cities are seen as the classical cen-
tres of overcrowding, corruption and sheer ‘lack’ so that “Each of the 
townships” the BMICPA brochure (2003) says, “has been proposed on 
a unique economic base, which will provide employment opportunities 
to the people in the region as well as prevent out-migration. It will also 
decongest the city by encouraging the population in the city to move 
out to the townships.” The consortium’s own plan is thin, profoundly 
vague and contradictory:  
The human scale predominates in the total planning of all the new 
townships, which are planned as self-contained communities, 
seeking a balance between sources of employment, business 
centres, centre for fashion technology, medical and other re-
search centres, etc. are suitably located in various townships 
which are essentially organised elements in a broad programme 
of decentralisation of the congested urban centres of Bangalore 
and Mysore. (Samiti n. d.: 53)  
Between the promise of “encouraging non-motorised forms of trans-
port” and an absolute dependence on the tolled expressway lies an 
inevitable paradox. Recklessly borrowing from Clarence Perry’s neigh-






























romantic language of New Urbanism in 1990s America, which was a 
powerful critique of, and answer to, the auto-mobilisation of America 
society, the thinness of the plan is deliberate: it offers plenitude of a 
kind, a bucolic ‘boutique rural’, wrested from active farming com-
munities and makes the township entirely dependent on the tolled 
expressway.  
Meanwhile, Bengaluru and Mysore, the two cities whose ‘salvation’ is 
also tied to the corridor, present a historically unique contrast to each 
other – one, which corridor urbanism will reduce to the cities’ lowest 
common denominator. Bengaluru is a city with little or no monumental 
heritage (apart from religious structures) to testify to its long past, and 
only a stilted public culture. Mysore, on the other hand, basks in the 
glow of its museumised city-space, which throughout the twentieth 
century had been successfully turned into a predominantly tourist 
destination (Nair 2011).32 The new Infrastructure Corridor ignores 
these two nodes in the interest of invoking investor interest in the new 
townships, which are an escape from the incorrigible problems of the 
two big cities. Moreover, the gap between the promised idylls of 
township living and the reality of the realty effect is already evident in 
the areas around Bengaluru, which have been acquired by NICE to 
date. By 2004, despite submissions to the Expert Committee headed 
by K.C. Reddy that 1,700 acres would be adequate for Township I at 
Bidadi and a mere 500 for a group housing scheme, a total of 2,387 
acres was sanctioned since “township should be developed to inter-
national standards and therefore it would be appropriate to allow the 
extent of land requested by the company” (J. C. Madhuswamy 2004: 
Annexures). 
This is clearly a very different vision from the one enunciated by the 
consortium. The bankruptcy of the company vision is deliberate, since 
it is tied to speculation, rather than planning per se. Indeed, planning 
may be precisely what NICE is avoiding in order to sustain a specu-
lative surge. As many challengers to these acquisitions have already 
pointed out, land was already being transacted between NICE and 
builders of gated colonies, urban space that accepts the necessity of 
“coarse grained” uses (i.e. reducing the kinds and numbers of activities 
possible in space), bypassing the opportunity of producing a “fine 
grained” social mix (encouraging occupational, class, race and other 
forms of population heterogeneity (Lynch 1981: 404-5). 
Has an alternative to this form of urbanism at least emerged among 






























two identifiable responses to this question. On the one hand, most of 
the cases filed by project-affected people, while beginning with the 
rhetoric of the epic battle between farm and factory, between liveli-
hoods and profits, go on to argue for a higher quantum of compen-
sation in a highly speculative and exploding real estate market (B. P. 
Kamala vs. State of Karnataka and Others 2006; Nandi Infrastructure 
Corridor Enterprises and Others vs. State of Karnataka and another 
2006). It is a process of transformation from which even smaller pea-
sants who have found it difficult to sustain agriculture are not exempt. 
“It is indeed sad”, the J. C. Madhuswamy submission said, “that the 
manner of acquisition has ranged from intimidation of farmers to 
cajoling them to give up their lands” (J.C. Madhuswamy 2004: §37). In 
his study of three tanks which have been acquired by the BMIC/NICE, 
Atul Kulkarni (2012) notes that the Kommaghatta tank bed has been 
converted into private layouts and sites. As one group of farmers told 
him,  
After 2010 onwards, several farmers protested and put cases in 
court against NICE. Then Govt set up a fast track court to deal 
with several cases related to acquisition of land under NICE. The 
price of the land was fixed by NICE was Rs 4 lakh per acre, but 
several landlords protested and negotiated to Rs 10 lakh per acre 
+ 60*40 site or Rs 9383 per feet, but settled for Rs 7 lakh per 
acre + one site. We, landlords have no choice, but to sell off land. 
(cit. in Kulkarni 2011: 51) 
The wealthier farmers have thus been under pressure to negotiate 
either directly or through courts for higher compensation, in recog-
nition of the changed field of forces, and the necessity of participating 
in, rather than resisting, the project which will without doubt change 
their lives and livelihoods. Clearly some ‘farmers’, as several other 
recent works have shown, are actively and profitably engaging with 
the market in land; rather than being gullible victims, as the petitions 
may suggest, s/he has acquiesced to the vision of the global city: it is 
more of a quarrel about acquisition rather than being against it. In 
other words, land losers wishing to participate in the speculative wave 
have succumbed to seductions of this urban form which extend out in 
the form of golf courses, theme parks, tech parks. The Dalita Sangarsh 
Samiti’s detailed exposure of the fraud that has been perpetrated on 
the people of the cities is an illuminating example of this ambivalence: 
the project must be supported but on terms that are fair to the 






























tives to the imagination of the urban proposed by NICE, except by 
invoking the rural-urban binary. (Fig. 8) 
    
Fig. 8: Map of Bangelore, c. 185034 
The poor and marginalised, on the other hand, have been left 
unrecognised by the authorities and the NICE/BBMP and BMICPA. Their 
opposition to the project within the legislature or in courts, in petitions 
and representations, or on the streets, continues to be defensive. They 
use the forms and strategies more appropriate to the well-known 
opposition between town and country. This collective misrecognition of 
the vastly altered field of forces, in which the judiciary plays the role of 
midwife, is in striking contrast to those who have acquiesced to the 
development. For we know, only too well, that the ‘rural’/village, parti-
cularly on such stretches between two major metropolises, has been a 
vulnerable entity: qualitative and quantitative studies alike have shown 
the marked shifts towards non-farm employment (Gupta 2005), 
confirmed in the increased visibility of ‘census towns’ (as opposed to 
‘statutory towns’) since 2011 (Pradhan 2013: 43-51). Between this 
apparent deterioration of the economic and social bases of the village, 
and a political interest in maintaining an archaism of strategy, no 
alternative urban future has been envisaged.  
We have however, the commitment of the current NDA government 
to the development of ‘smart cities’ in anticipation of the massive 






























The judiciary, which once played a crucial role in supporting the state 
in its creation of a public sector in public interest, and in developing 
cities to support and nurture those patriotic dreams, also upheld a 
notion of justice. While it still speaks out strongly against the vacil-
lations of representative politics, it plays a different role, recognising 
that the production of space, a commodity like no other, requires a 
redefinition of who speaks for public interest. As even this limited 
analysis of judgements reveal, the judiciary appears to be defining 
neo-dirigisme as a necessary complement to the production of urbani-
sable space. 
Through all these changes, the city as we knew it stands threatened 
by the generalised urbanism that is being promoted. One could, as 
Mumford reminded us, breach the wall, and storm the citadel, but with 
what weapons does one combat the faceless forces of change that 
engender this relentless urbanisation? And with what imaginations 
(Harvey 2008)? The reluctant urbanisation of early twentieth century 
India was read by some as a sign of the hesitation, perhaps even pre-
ference, of the Mysore villager who lived by the dictum that only ‘after 
the ruin, go to the city’. Now it is the ruins of the city that are being 
laid at the entrances to the villages which are already being abandoned 
or changed, as they uncertainly join the urban order. 
 Rajesh Bhattacharya and Kalyan Sanyal have recently analysed the 
arrival of this form of urbanism in “post-colonial India”, characterised 
by “the crisis of subsistence-oriented economic activities and the 
subsistence/accumulation contradiction” which “plays out as an end-
less game of eviction and encroachment.”35 Yet the participation of a 
heterogeneous rural population, including subsistence farmers, in pro-
ducing the space for the information-intensive sectors of the post 
colony, a new phase of capitalist development in short, with its conse-
quences not only the new urban form that is being spawned but its 
effects on the historical city, has not been addressed. This is an 
inaugural step towards elaborating urbanisation as an effect of such 
capitalist accumulation.  
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